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SAID: Empowering Large Language Models with Self-Activating Internal Defense

Authors: Yulong Chen, Yadong Liu, Jiawen Zhang, Mu Li, Chao Huang, Jie Wen

Published: 2025-10-23

arXiv ID: 2510.20129v1

Added to Library: 2025-10-24 04:01 UTC

Red Teaming

📄 Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs), despite advances in safety alignment, remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks designed to circumvent protective mechanisms. Prevailing defense strategies rely on external interventions, such as input filtering or output modification, which often lack generalizability and compromise model utility while incurring significant computational overhead. In this work, we introduce a new, training-free defense paradigm, Self-Activating Internal Defense (SAID), which reframes the defense task from external correction to internal capability activation. SAID uniquely leverages the LLM's own reasoning abilities to proactively identify and neutralize malicious intent through a three-stage pipeline: model-native intent distillation to extract core semantics, optimal safety prefix probing to activate latent safety awareness, and a conservative aggregation strategy to ensure robust decision-making. Extensive experiments on five open-source LLMs against six advanced jailbreak attacks demonstrate that SAID substantially outperforms state-of-the-art defenses in reducing harmful outputs. Crucially, it achieves this while preserving model performance on benign tasks and incurring minimal computational overhead. Our work establishes that activating the intrinsic safety mechanisms of LLMs is a more robust and scalable path toward building safer and more reliable aligned AI systems.

🔍 Key Points

  • Introduces Self-Activating Internal Defense (SAID), a training-free defense framework that repurposes LLMs' internal capabilities for proactive safety without additional training.
  • Employs a three-stage pipeline: Model-Native Intent Distillation, Optimal Safety Prefix Probing, and Conservative Aggregation to enhance defense effectiveness.
  • Demonstrates substantial performance improvements against six jailbreak attack methods, outperforming existing state-of-the-art defenses while maintaining low computational overhead.
  • Establishes that engaging with the model's intrinsic reasoning can activate its safety features, providing a scalable and generalizable approach to LLM defense.
  • Experimental results highlight a robust safety-utility trade-off, indicating that SAID effectively reduces harmful outputs while preserving benign task performance.

💡 Why This Paper Matters

The SAID framework exemplifies a significant advancement in LLM safety mechanisms, providing a robust, scalable method to defend against diverse attack vectors while upholding performance standards. Its innovative approach of leveraging internal model capabilities addresses critical gaps in current defensive strategies, making it a valuable contribution to the field of AI safety and alignment.

🎯 Why It's Interesting for AI Security Researchers

This paper is of great interest to AI security researchers as it provides novel methodologies for strengthening LLM defenses against increasingly sophisticated jailbreak attacks. By focusing on internal defenses rather than external interventions, the research opens avenues for more resilient AI systems, which is crucial in developing trusted and safe AI applications. Furthermore, the empirical validation across multiple models and attack scenarios adds to its significance, making it a cornerstone for future research in AI alignment and safety.

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