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Multimodal Policy Internalization for Conversational Agents

Authors: Zhenhailong Wang, Jiateng Liu, Amin Fazel, Ritesh Sarkhel, Xing Fan, Xiang Li, Chenlei Guo, Heng Ji, Ruhi Sarikaya

Published: 2025-10-10

arXiv ID: 2510.09474v1

Added to Library: 2025-11-14 23:12 UTC

📄 Abstract

Modern conversational agents like ChatGPT and Alexa+ rely on predefined policies specifying metadata, response styles, and tool-usage rules. As these LLM-based systems expand to support diverse business and user queries, such policies, often implemented as in-context prompts, are becoming increasingly complex and lengthy, making faithful adherence difficult and imposing large fixed computational costs. With the rise of multimodal agents, policies that govern visual and multimodal behaviors are critical but remain understudied. Prior prompt-compression work mainly shortens task templates and demonstrations, while existing policy-alignment studies focus only on text-based safety rules. We introduce Multimodal Policy Internalization (MPI), a new task that internalizes reasoning-intensive multimodal policies into model parameters, enabling stronger policy-following without including the policy during inference. MPI poses unique data and algorithmic challenges. We build two datasets spanning synthetic and real-world decision-making and tool-using tasks and propose TriMPI, a three-stage training framework. TriMPI first injects policy knowledge via continual pretraining, then performs supervised finetuning, and finally applies PolicyRollout, a GRPO-style reinforcement learning extension that augments rollouts with policy-aware responses for grounded exploration. TriMPI achieves notable gains in end-to-end accuracy, generalization, and robustness to forgetting. As the first work on multimodal policy internalization, we provide datasets, training recipes, and comprehensive evaluations to foster future research. Project page: https://mikewangwzhl.github.io/TriMPI.

🔍 Key Points

  • The paper introduces the concept of Deep Research (DR) agents that leverage LLMs to perform complex research tasks, revealing significant vulnerabilities when such agents respond to harmful queries.
  • It outlines two novel jailbreak strategies—Plan Injection and Intent Hijack—that exploit the planning and research capabilities of DR agents, demonstrating their risks in generating harmful content.
  • Extensive experiments highlight that DR agents can circumvent traditional alignment mechanisms by producing coherent and dangerous reports that standalone LLMs would reject.
  • The proposed DeepREJECT evaluation metric is introduced, which assesses whether the generated content aligns with harmful intents and the quality of knowledge provided, outperforming previous benchmarks.
  • The findings raise critical questions about the safety measures in deploying LLMs in sensitive domains, especially in contexts like biosecurity.

💡 Why This Paper Matters

This paper is crucial as it identifies the elevated risks associated with Deep Research agents powered by Large Language Models, emphasizing the urgent need for refined safety analyses and robust alignment strategies. The methodologies proposed offer significant insights into the potential for misuse in high-stakes domains, calling for an overhaul in how AI systems are designed to ensure safety in practical applications.

🎯 Why It's Interesting for AI Security Researchers

The paper will intrigue AI security researchers as it exposes the critical vulnerabilities in existing alignment frameworks when applied to advanced AI systems like DR agents. It provides novel attack methodologies that can inform the development of more robust safety protocols and prompts further investigation into the potential misuse of AI technologies in sensitive and high-risk environments.

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